The summer of 2003 was a hot, frustrating time for coalition forces in Iraq. In Baghdad, soldiers experienced temperatures over 100*F for 91 consecutive days.[3]
Far worse, contrary to the expectations of most soldiers and their leaders, there was not only an active Iraqi insurgency but an insurgency that was growing rapidly in size and lethality across the country. In July, coalition forces experienced twice the number of attacks they had experienced in June.[4] And, in August, they witnessed the rise of the "vehicleborne explosive device", to include a suicide car bombing on 11 August 2003 in Baghdad that killed 11 people and closed the Jordanian Embassy. Amidst Iraq's summer heat and many bombs, the hope of many U.S. soldiers for returning home by Christmas had evaporated.
It was in this context that a Military Intelligence (MI) captain working in the CJ2X section of Combined Joint Task Force-7 (CJTF-7) sent a 14 August 2003 email to the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) section leaders of CJTF-7's major subordinate commands.[5] In the opening salvo of what would become a battle for the soul of CJTF-7's HUMINT community, this captain requested a "wish list" from subordinates of interrogation techniques they "felt would be effective."[6] He stated that "the gloves are coming off...regarding these detainees," and he said that the Deputy CJ2 "has made it clear that we want these individuals broken."[7]He concluded that the "casualties are mounting and we need to start gathering info to help protect our fellow soldiers from any further attacks."[8]
This email evoked strongly worded, antithetical responses from the two ideologies (or "camps") of CJTF-7's subordinate HUMINT sections. One camp (to which the CJ2X captain also clearly belonged) included Chief Warrant Officer 3 (CW3) Lewis Welshofer, Jr., of the 3rd Armored Cavalry Regiment and an unidentified HUMINT leader of the 4th Infantry Division.[9] The other camp was represented by Major (MAJ) Nathan Hoepner, the operations officer of the 501st Military Intelligence (MI) Battalion, Task Force 1st Armored Division. The units of all three of these officers operated in the "Sunni Triangle," the most dangerous part of Iraq during Operation IRAQI FREEDOM I (OIF I).
In his reply to the CJ2X captain's email, CW3 Welshofer wrote that "a baseline interrogation technique" should include "open handed facial slaps from a distance of no more than about two feet and back handed blows to the midsection from a distance of about 18 inches."[10] He also added: "Close confinement quarters, sleep deprivation, white noise, and a litnany [sic] of harsher fear-up approaches...fear of dogs and snakes appear to work nicely. I firmly agree that the gloves need to come off."[11] The unidentified 4th Infantry Division HUMINT leader submitted a "wish list" that included some of the same techniques but also added "Stimulus Deprivation," "Pressure Point Manipulation," "Close-Fist
Strikes," "Muscle Fatigue Inducement," and "Low Voltage Electrocution."[12]
In his returning salvo, MAJ Hoepner spoke from a higher vantage point:
- As for ‘the gloves need to come off' ...we need to take a deep breath and remember who we are...Those gloves are...based on clearly established standards of international law to which we are signatories and in part the originators...something we cannot just put aside when we find it inconvenient...We have taken casualties in every war we have ever fought--that is part of the very nature of war. We also inflict casualties, generally many more than we take. That in no way justifies letting go of our standards. We have NEVER considered our enemies justified in doing such things to us. Casualties are part of war--if you cannot take casualties then you cannot engage in war. Period. BOTTOM LINE: We are American soldiers, heirs of a long tradition of staying on the high ground. We need to stay there.[13]
We Americans, MAJ Hoepner was saying, adhere to moral standards that are more important to us than simply winning a battle: to forfeit these standards is to lose who we are as American soldiers.
[...]
At stake is not just our preventing future strategic defeat, which is important enough, but our permanently solving what briefly became an existential crisis for our Army. This crisis arose when the "end justifies the means" camp grew far more influential than it should have grown during OIF I. Although this camp will always have adherents, this camp is not who we are, and it is definitely not who we should become.
we use here.. 
