Fitness Standards Suck
You got much of your stuff right on. I am a member of a battalion in Florida. At our last drill we had a PT test. The results are deeply troubling. The failure rate was over 60%. That is terrible.
As an inactive member of our national defense it is incumbent on us to maintain physical fitness on our own. Active military has regular PT to keep them up to the 'standard'. I say that because the standard has been lowered to allow for women to stick around. Matter of fact, word on the street is men are not required to move with heavy weapons as a standard for some jobs because NO females can do it. The standard for a female age 27 is the same for a male age 62+. What is that all about?
Anyway, I am one of the few that does Pt on my own 5 days a week. I outperformed all but the Lt. and one other. I am 30 and the rest are primarily 6-11 years younger. There is a WorldNetDaily article titled 'Israeli Women Won't See Combat' that will interest you. It is eye opening but will be ignored because of the feminist movement. I wonder if the Pentagon is going to enforce the recent declaration that any reservist not meeting the minimum standard is to be flagged for discharge.
SERGEANT PROUDLY SERVING IN THE GUARD
Letters From The Front
Moderator: Super Moderators
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Sir,
I am a team leader in a National Guard infantry squad. I am not what most would consider hard-core. I transferred directly into the guard as an NCO from the Navy, where I was a Nuclear Electronics Technician\Reactor Operator.
With such little experience in the Army, and with my technical, submariner background, you might expect that I would be impressed at the level of leadership and discipline I ecountered as an infantry NCO. Unfortunately, the opposite is true.
I started having serious misgivings during mobilization, when we couldn't seem to get a schedule, an OP-order, or a timeframe we would be there. Those misgivings were further reinforced when the unit responsible for validating us as deployment ready recommended removing the senior leadership in 2 out of 3 companies. That recommendation was disregarded. Other hints of our eventual experience would be being told that our command was trying to get a mission away from the conflict; our command lived twenty minuted away in Kuwait in barracks, while we lived in tents.
Some of us came to believe that, because our unit hadn't been mobilized in such a long time, some ineffective leaders had moved into positions of authority and we happened to be saddled with them. We assured ourselves that the real army couldn't be this uncoordinated, removed, and blatently weak. We have several ex-Rangers, 101st, and Recon guys in NCO positions that work to maintain standards and make up for the lack of concern or ability we are experiencing with our company leadership. Over time, we've adjusted and come to a sense of resignation concerning National Guard and reserve standards.
Our sense of alarm has renewed, however, in light of recent events. A soldier in my unit neglected to bring any of his required equipment to stand watch recently, then when questioned by his squad leader, lied about it. In response, this soldier was required to stand at his gate wearing his full combat gear. This is just flackvest, kevlar, packed j-list, and weapon.
When the regular army unit we are attached to found out about this, the soldier's squad leader, platoon sergeant were berated by a CSM about the cruelty of this action. Despite the fact that we just completed a 6 month mission which required us to all wear that equipment 12 hours a day in 135 degree weather, it was cruel to make a soldier wear the equipment he forgot in 90 degrees at a gate with all the water he can drink. When told that we are infantry and expect better of our soldiers, the post CSM told us that we are in a new situation now and need to soften up. How incredibly depressing it was to hear that.
Our battalion command refers to our companies' retention rates as an "anomoly". Of 140 men who were eager to get the chance to fight back in February, only 2 have extended their contracts, none reenlisted.
I greatly appreciate those like you who fight to keep our military strong. I sincerely hope that you are successful, because if you aren't, I'm afraid there won't be much of a military left.
Sincerely
Sgt. US ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
SFTT
(Automatically edited by FF)
Sir,
I am a team leader in a National Guard infantry squad. I am not what most would consider hard-core. I transferred directly into the guard as an NCO from the Navy, where I was a Nuclear Electronics Technician\Reactor Operator.
With such little experience in the Army, and with my technical, submariner background, you might expect that I would be impressed at the level of leadership and discipline I ecountered as an infantry NCO. Unfortunately, the opposite is true.
I started having serious misgivings during mobilization, when we couldn't seem to get a schedule, an OP-order, or a timeframe we would be there. Those misgivings were further reinforced when the unit responsible for validating us as deployment ready recommended removing the senior leadership in 2 out of 3 companies. That recommendation was disregarded. Other hints of our eventual experience would be being told that our command was trying to get a mission away from the conflict; our command lived twenty minuted away in Kuwait in barracks, while we lived in tents.
Some of us came to believe that, because our unit hadn't been mobilized in such a long time, some ineffective leaders had moved into positions of authority and we happened to be saddled with them. We assured ourselves that the real army couldn't be this uncoordinated, removed, and blatently weak. We have several ex-Rangers, 101st, and Recon guys in NCO positions that work to maintain standards and make up for the lack of concern or ability we are experiencing with our company leadership. Over time, we've adjusted and come to a sense of resignation concerning National Guard and reserve standards.
Our sense of alarm has renewed, however, in light of recent events. A soldier in my unit neglected to bring any of his required equipment to stand watch recently, then when questioned by his squad leader, lied about it. In response, this soldier was required to stand at his gate wearing his full combat gear. This is just flackvest, kevlar, packed j-list, and weapon.
When the regular army unit we are attached to found out about this, the soldier's squad leader, platoon sergeant were berated by a CSM about the cruelty of this action. Despite the fact that we just completed a 6 month mission which required us to all wear that equipment 12 hours a day in 135 degree weather, it was cruel to make a soldier wear the equipment he forgot in 90 degrees at a gate with all the water he can drink. When told that we are infantry and expect better of our soldiers, the post CSM told us that we are in a new situation now and need to soften up. How incredibly depressing it was to hear that.
Our battalion command refers to our companies' retention rates as an "anomoly". Of 140 men who were eager to get the chance to fight back in February, only 2 have extended their contracts, none reenlisted.
I greatly appreciate those like you who fight to keep our military strong. I sincerely hope that you are successful, because if you aren't, I'm afraid there won't be much of a military left.
Sincerely
Sgt. US ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
SFTT
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Reserve/Guard Suck. So Says A Commander…
I recently read your article on the problems with the Guard and Reserves. I found it to be direct and to the point. As a commander of a guard unit it is frustrating to me to try and maintain the op tempo I'm given with limited time and resources.
My soldiers are expected to maintain the same standards as there active counter part with 1% of the training they are given, and of course I'm faced with the dilemma of keeping soldiers who are fat, can't qualify with a weapon and are just there to get the VA benefits.
All of this you rightly brought to light in your article. I hope that through your influence you can make some of our political reprobates change there minds and push for moving guard men and reservist to the support missions you specified.
Thank you for your input!
Yours truly,
A concerned commander!
SFTT
(Automatically edited by FF)
Reserve/Guard Suck. So Says A Commander…
I recently read your article on the problems with the Guard and Reserves. I found it to be direct and to the point. As a commander of a guard unit it is frustrating to me to try and maintain the op tempo I'm given with limited time and resources.
My soldiers are expected to maintain the same standards as there active counter part with 1% of the training they are given, and of course I'm faced with the dilemma of keeping soldiers who are fat, can't qualify with a weapon and are just there to get the VA benefits.
All of this you rightly brought to light in your article. I hope that through your influence you can make some of our political reprobates change there minds and push for moving guard men and reservist to the support missions you specified.
Thank you for your input!
Yours truly,
A concerned commander!
SFTT
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
An Attaboy From A Lt Colonel Who Knows The Ground Truth
COL Hackworth,
Your article on the poor state of our Army reserves is dead on. I am an AC/RC battalion commander. The Army's process for training and assessing NG readiness, as best as I can tell from my seat, is broken. We are about to ramrod MY NG BD through a brief training program to launch them toward Iraq next year. I am not optimistic they are up to the task. The system needs a complete overhaul. I agree with the idea of placing active duty leadership in key positions---I think aggressive and competent leadership at the battalion and brigade command level can make a big difference if all we can get is a short term fix for now. Commanders are afraid to hurt people's feelings and effect the bottomline, retention. As a result, readiness suffers---a lot. And also you are right on about the type units we place in the reserves.
It's ludicrous to expect the NG to produce competent armor brigades, even if they were well-resourced and commanded by the best leaders in the Army. I don't think they can produce competent combat arms units period under the current system, including light infantry. The other endemic problem is unity of command. During mobilization training periods, there are multiple headquarters with their fingers in the pot. The deploying unit does not take ownership of the training plan and does not take themselves to task to get ready. But, of course, the problem starts well before M-day hits.
KEEP PUTTING THE TRUTH OUT THERE
RA LT COL WITH THE NG
SFTT
(Automatically edited by FF)
An Attaboy From A Lt Colonel Who Knows The Ground Truth
COL Hackworth,
Your article on the poor state of our Army reserves is dead on. I am an AC/RC battalion commander. The Army's process for training and assessing NG readiness, as best as I can tell from my seat, is broken. We are about to ramrod MY NG BD through a brief training program to launch them toward Iraq next year. I am not optimistic they are up to the task. The system needs a complete overhaul. I agree with the idea of placing active duty leadership in key positions---I think aggressive and competent leadership at the battalion and brigade command level can make a big difference if all we can get is a short term fix for now. Commanders are afraid to hurt people's feelings and effect the bottomline, retention. As a result, readiness suffers---a lot. And also you are right on about the type units we place in the reserves.
It's ludicrous to expect the NG to produce competent armor brigades, even if they were well-resourced and commanded by the best leaders in the Army. I don't think they can produce competent combat arms units period under the current system, including light infantry. The other endemic problem is unity of command. During mobilization training periods, there are multiple headquarters with their fingers in the pot. The deploying unit does not take ownership of the training plan and does not take themselves to task to get ready. But, of course, the problem starts well before M-day hits.
KEEP PUTTING THE TRUTH OUT THERE
RA LT COL WITH THE NG
SFTT
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Bad Leadership And Screwed Priorities In Iraq
I will begin by telling you I am in a combat support unit. An aviation intermediate maintenance company. I have served in the Army for 20 years and am currently assigned to the 101st Airborne division. This is my 4th combat deployment with the rest being Panama, Gulf war 1 Afghanistan and now here.
This is by far the most ludicrious deployment I have been on. Lets begin with the commander, He is typical of your "new breed" of officer. I am a technical inspector on chinook helicopters, we also support the blackhawks, the apaches and the OH-58's. I have never seen this man in the work area or the hangars after the first week he took command. I guess it didnt take him to0 long to figure out that his unit acomplishing the mission wasnt enough, see on the evaluation reports of today they all want numbers, they are what determines his success or failure. It doesnt matter that we have supported the divisions flying hour program or have supported X amount of units since we have been here it is, get this, how many soldiers he has qualified on a 12 mile road march while deployed in a combat zone.
Now physical fitness is a wondeful thing but to take a support soldier and have him do a forced road march you loose at least two days of productive work from him because he is to sore to move. To top it off the 101st has opened an "air assault" school here and they have dropped the 12 mile road march in under 3 hours from their course. So outside the numbers on his evaluation how is this statistic relavent? We also do timed four mile runs and conduct orginized pt five days a week. Like I said do not get me wrong thats a wonderful thing to be fit, but when you wake a soldier for pt at 6am and make him work till 9pm because he hasnt finished what is expected of him I say give the soldier a chance to complete the mission and if he falls behind then he has earned the right to work 14 to 15 hour days.
Another thing that chaps my ass is the broken dicks back at fort campbell, they came out and told them that if they didnt have a legitamate reason to deploy they would be considered for seperation from the service. Well wouldnt you know that nine months into this deployment we got 15-20 soldiers suddenly appear. Now if the guy has a legitamate reason not to deploy I am fine with that but when you have to threaten them with seperation to get there fat broke lazy ass out here that should send up a signal that they shouldnt be in the military in the first place, but they let these 10%ers hang around. Just think they come out here for 3 months and recieve the same benifits as myself or others who have been deployed more than me.
I did Afghanistan and then here and we even have some that just got back from Bosnia right before Afghanistan. There is a PFC in our unit with three overseas stripes on his class A uniform but he hasnt gotten a service stripe yet. To top it off most of these 10%ers I refer to are NCO's. It would make the NCO's that mentored me early in my career cringe. When I joined all my NCO's were the last of the Vietnam era and they knew that they had to take care of the troops and what needed to be done, if you were dead weight you were told thank you but find another profession. Seems like the kinder gentler "army of one" doesnt want to leave anyone behind.
The females all know that if they cozy up with the platoon sgts or the first sgt they will recieve the advance to go card. They all see it they know it and they play it. There are some fine women soldiers in the service but most are just on the glorified welfare system. When I was on guard during the war I was reading my guard sop and the last line was "if all else fails and you must resort to deadly force, shoot the bastards" well a female master sgt saw it and threw a hissy, she said that was innapropriate and that language should be taken out immediatly. What the hell did she want the guards to do, invite the bastard in for tea?
Ok the next gripe is awards. We have a female staff sgt who was just awarded the bronze star, what did this high speed supply sgt do to "earn" this prostigious award? She processed over 10,000 requests for avaition repair parts. I am sorry but when does doing your job from the safety of the division rear area qualify you for an award of the caliber? She hasnt even left the base she is on for the nine months we have been here. Meanwhile I have friends in the infantry and artillery who go out on patrol on a regular basis and swap lead with the bad guys and they are lucky to recieve an arcom. The system is broke and most awards issued arent worth the paper that they are written on.
Please dont get me wrong, there are some bright wonderful hard charging troops in todays army and some of them have the potential to be wonderful soldiers and leaders. I guess the point of this rambling is that with the current command philosiphy and the me first attitudes of everyone from the sqd leader to the section sgt to the plt sgt to the sg to the cdr to the lt col is a cancer that is slowly sucking the life out of our military. To be honest I am close to retirement because if I would have come up thru the ranks now I would have never stayed past one enlistment. Compared to some of the NCO's and officers that mentored me early in my career most of todays leaders arent fit to hold there coffee cup. I hope my rambling doesnt sound to much like sour grapes to you its just getting to the point where I get so frustrated over seeing the attitudes of whats in it for me vs. how can we accomplish this mission....thanks for listening.....
A PISSED OFF REGULAR SERGEANT
SFTT
(Automatically edited by FF)
Bad Leadership And Screwed Priorities In Iraq
I will begin by telling you I am in a combat support unit. An aviation intermediate maintenance company. I have served in the Army for 20 years and am currently assigned to the 101st Airborne division. This is my 4th combat deployment with the rest being Panama, Gulf war 1 Afghanistan and now here.
This is by far the most ludicrious deployment I have been on. Lets begin with the commander, He is typical of your "new breed" of officer. I am a technical inspector on chinook helicopters, we also support the blackhawks, the apaches and the OH-58's. I have never seen this man in the work area or the hangars after the first week he took command. I guess it didnt take him to0 long to figure out that his unit acomplishing the mission wasnt enough, see on the evaluation reports of today they all want numbers, they are what determines his success or failure. It doesnt matter that we have supported the divisions flying hour program or have supported X amount of units since we have been here it is, get this, how many soldiers he has qualified on a 12 mile road march while deployed in a combat zone.
Now physical fitness is a wondeful thing but to take a support soldier and have him do a forced road march you loose at least two days of productive work from him because he is to sore to move. To top it off the 101st has opened an "air assault" school here and they have dropped the 12 mile road march in under 3 hours from their course. So outside the numbers on his evaluation how is this statistic relavent? We also do timed four mile runs and conduct orginized pt five days a week. Like I said do not get me wrong thats a wonderful thing to be fit, but when you wake a soldier for pt at 6am and make him work till 9pm because he hasnt finished what is expected of him I say give the soldier a chance to complete the mission and if he falls behind then he has earned the right to work 14 to 15 hour days.
Another thing that chaps my ass is the broken dicks back at fort campbell, they came out and told them that if they didnt have a legitamate reason to deploy they would be considered for seperation from the service. Well wouldnt you know that nine months into this deployment we got 15-20 soldiers suddenly appear. Now if the guy has a legitamate reason not to deploy I am fine with that but when you have to threaten them with seperation to get there fat broke lazy ass out here that should send up a signal that they shouldnt be in the military in the first place, but they let these 10%ers hang around. Just think they come out here for 3 months and recieve the same benifits as myself or others who have been deployed more than me.
I did Afghanistan and then here and we even have some that just got back from Bosnia right before Afghanistan. There is a PFC in our unit with three overseas stripes on his class A uniform but he hasnt gotten a service stripe yet. To top it off most of these 10%ers I refer to are NCO's. It would make the NCO's that mentored me early in my career cringe. When I joined all my NCO's were the last of the Vietnam era and they knew that they had to take care of the troops and what needed to be done, if you were dead weight you were told thank you but find another profession. Seems like the kinder gentler "army of one" doesnt want to leave anyone behind.
The females all know that if they cozy up with the platoon sgts or the first sgt they will recieve the advance to go card. They all see it they know it and they play it. There are some fine women soldiers in the service but most are just on the glorified welfare system. When I was on guard during the war I was reading my guard sop and the last line was "if all else fails and you must resort to deadly force, shoot the bastards" well a female master sgt saw it and threw a hissy, she said that was innapropriate and that language should be taken out immediatly. What the hell did she want the guards to do, invite the bastard in for tea?
Ok the next gripe is awards. We have a female staff sgt who was just awarded the bronze star, what did this high speed supply sgt do to "earn" this prostigious award? She processed over 10,000 requests for avaition repair parts. I am sorry but when does doing your job from the safety of the division rear area qualify you for an award of the caliber? She hasnt even left the base she is on for the nine months we have been here. Meanwhile I have friends in the infantry and artillery who go out on patrol on a regular basis and swap lead with the bad guys and they are lucky to recieve an arcom. The system is broke and most awards issued arent worth the paper that they are written on.
Please dont get me wrong, there are some bright wonderful hard charging troops in todays army and some of them have the potential to be wonderful soldiers and leaders. I guess the point of this rambling is that with the current command philosiphy and the me first attitudes of everyone from the sqd leader to the section sgt to the plt sgt to the sg to the cdr to the lt col is a cancer that is slowly sucking the life out of our military. To be honest I am close to retirement because if I would have come up thru the ranks now I would have never stayed past one enlistment. Compared to some of the NCO's and officers that mentored me early in my career most of todays leaders arent fit to hold there coffee cup. I hope my rambling doesnt sound to much like sour grapes to you its just getting to the point where I get so frustrated over seeing the attitudes of whats in it for me vs. how can we accomplish this mission....thanks for listening.....
A PISSED OFF REGULAR SERGEANT
SFTT
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
A Dad With A Son In Iraq Sounds Off
I apologize for my e-mail rebuttal of your story about the unfit Army Reserve.
You were correct! My son, a CW-4 Chinook pilot, verifies your account of the sorry state of the Reserves. In his outfit 8-12 of the 35 pilots are grounded. They have pilots as old as 58 and the older pilots are not holding up physically. The only woman helo pilot, a Hispanic, got grounded long ago for incompetence. She dumped and damaged too many sling loads of gear being off-loaded plus no one would fly with her. She promptly found female "physical problems" yet she is doing a story as the flying, fighting grandma combat pilot. A lot of the rest are not night vision goggle qualified and, at the moment, do not want to be. That leaves a few, like my son, flying their butts off and taking the bulk of the risk. Some sister outfits only have a couple of night vision qualified pilots.
The guys in his outfit are of the opinion that Gens Abizaid and Sanchez should be relieved for not taking the offense sooner and kicking butt or informing Rummy and Bush that the Army cannot fight like this when every bullet must be vetted by a Pentagon or Centcom lawyer. They strongly believe a big offense is the best defense and will save lives. They see shades of Viet Nam here with the big brass fighting the war in their armchairs.
If you can do anything to publicize this misuse of our G.I.'s I would appreciate it and I know the troops would.
CONCERNED POP
SFTT
(Automatically edited by FF)
A Dad With A Son In Iraq Sounds Off
I apologize for my e-mail rebuttal of your story about the unfit Army Reserve.
You were correct! My son, a CW-4 Chinook pilot, verifies your account of the sorry state of the Reserves. In his outfit 8-12 of the 35 pilots are grounded. They have pilots as old as 58 and the older pilots are not holding up physically. The only woman helo pilot, a Hispanic, got grounded long ago for incompetence. She dumped and damaged too many sling loads of gear being off-loaded plus no one would fly with her. She promptly found female "physical problems" yet she is doing a story as the flying, fighting grandma combat pilot. A lot of the rest are not night vision goggle qualified and, at the moment, do not want to be. That leaves a few, like my son, flying their butts off and taking the bulk of the risk. Some sister outfits only have a couple of night vision qualified pilots.
The guys in his outfit are of the opinion that Gens Abizaid and Sanchez should be relieved for not taking the offense sooner and kicking butt or informing Rummy and Bush that the Army cannot fight like this when every bullet must be vetted by a Pentagon or Centcom lawyer. They strongly believe a big offense is the best defense and will save lives. They see shades of Viet Nam here with the big brass fighting the war in their armchairs.
If you can do anything to publicize this misuse of our G.I.'s I would appreciate it and I know the troops would.
CONCERNED POP
SFTT
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Infantry officer in the Corps, here, and I’m frustrated. I thought you could shed some light on this, or at least open some eyes.
My question is this: Why are we continuing to have dead soldiers almost every day in Iraq? I ask this question knowing full well that people die in war, and despite what our government is telling us, we are still at war. But it’s how our boys are dying that bothers me. How many soldier have to die due to an “improvised explosive devise” before we change our tactics/routes?? It begs the question: Are the Iraqis that good, or is our Army that bad??
I’ve heard recent stories from a Marine unit that stayed behind that while they were out on vehicle and foot patrols, they were not targeted ambushed. The very next day, same route, Army unit….ambush. The Marines’ explanation was this: Marines go on patrol with chinstraps snapped, loaded for bear, all eyes/weapons outboard, ready for anything. Army units were going out “with a-drivers sleeping, some soldiers with walkmen on”…and they get hit. Who knows how accurate this is, but it makes you think: are the small unit leaders in the Army doing their job???
One look at the photo below would answer my question with a resounding “no”. These soldiers are supposedly on patrol. I’m not there, so who knows…they may be sitting in a secure area. But the photo caption says they are on patrol, so let’s assume the press actually has this caption right, and they are on patrol. Since when do we “rest” on a patrol? And if we are at a security halt (see “rest”), we don’t gaggle on the side of the street tightly packed into the 15 meter casualty radius of the common fragmentation grenade. No weapons facing outboard, no dispersion, and no discipline means no leadership…plain and simple. Hell…my 94 year old grandmother could lob one in on these guys, and then they’d get another Is the Army underestimating their enemy? It would seem so. They are not fighting random bands of thugs; this is a well-coordinated guerilla effort, and from the look of things, the army is losing the battle.
Another story here, and this one will make you sick to your stomach. A friend relayed it to me. An Army small unit is on patrol with a reporter accompanying them, recording everything. They pull into some alley and start hassling a bunch of cab drivers...and you can hear them saying things like "Dont' you guys speak English? What the hell's wrong with you?"
The Sergeant gets back in his vehicle and says something like, "We should just shoot some of them...that would get their attention." And everyone in the Hummer laughs.
Yes, they were kidding, but what idiot talks like this while the press is right there? And an NCO, to boot. My friend reminds me of something General Krulak once said…something like "I never pick certain Marines to talk to the media...just let 'em pick any of our boys and they will say the right things." And it's true: whenever you hear any random Marine speak, it is always something strong and disciplined...something good and positive. I guess the doggies in the above story didn’t see General Krulak’s memo. And after treating these cabbies like crap, they may have recruited a few more guys for the other side.
I’m interested to hear what you and your staff have to say about this. Am I way off base on this one? Yes…soldiers die…that is a part of war. But sure as hell seems like our soldiers are dying the same deaths, and it is time that their leaders get into the good old OODA loop of the insurgents, and take the initiative back. I guess we’ll see if I’m right or not when the Corps goes back en masse next year.
Semper Fi.
FRUSTRATED CAPTAIN
(Automatically edited by FF)
Infantry officer in the Corps, here, and I’m frustrated. I thought you could shed some light on this, or at least open some eyes.
My question is this: Why are we continuing to have dead soldiers almost every day in Iraq? I ask this question knowing full well that people die in war, and despite what our government is telling us, we are still at war. But it’s how our boys are dying that bothers me. How many soldier have to die due to an “improvised explosive devise” before we change our tactics/routes?? It begs the question: Are the Iraqis that good, or is our Army that bad??
I’ve heard recent stories from a Marine unit that stayed behind that while they were out on vehicle and foot patrols, they were not targeted ambushed. The very next day, same route, Army unit….ambush. The Marines’ explanation was this: Marines go on patrol with chinstraps snapped, loaded for bear, all eyes/weapons outboard, ready for anything. Army units were going out “with a-drivers sleeping, some soldiers with walkmen on”…and they get hit. Who knows how accurate this is, but it makes you think: are the small unit leaders in the Army doing their job???
One look at the photo below would answer my question with a resounding “no”. These soldiers are supposedly on patrol. I’m not there, so who knows…they may be sitting in a secure area. But the photo caption says they are on patrol, so let’s assume the press actually has this caption right, and they are on patrol. Since when do we “rest” on a patrol? And if we are at a security halt (see “rest”), we don’t gaggle on the side of the street tightly packed into the 15 meter casualty radius of the common fragmentation grenade. No weapons facing outboard, no dispersion, and no discipline means no leadership…plain and simple. Hell…my 94 year old grandmother could lob one in on these guys, and then they’d get another Is the Army underestimating their enemy? It would seem so. They are not fighting random bands of thugs; this is a well-coordinated guerilla effort, and from the look of things, the army is losing the battle.
Another story here, and this one will make you sick to your stomach. A friend relayed it to me. An Army small unit is on patrol with a reporter accompanying them, recording everything. They pull into some alley and start hassling a bunch of cab drivers...and you can hear them saying things like "Dont' you guys speak English? What the hell's wrong with you?"
The Sergeant gets back in his vehicle and says something like, "We should just shoot some of them...that would get their attention." And everyone in the Hummer laughs.
Yes, they were kidding, but what idiot talks like this while the press is right there? And an NCO, to boot. My friend reminds me of something General Krulak once said…something like "I never pick certain Marines to talk to the media...just let 'em pick any of our boys and they will say the right things." And it's true: whenever you hear any random Marine speak, it is always something strong and disciplined...something good and positive. I guess the doggies in the above story didn’t see General Krulak’s memo. And after treating these cabbies like crap, they may have recruited a few more guys for the other side.
I’m interested to hear what you and your staff have to say about this. Am I way off base on this one? Yes…soldiers die…that is a part of war. But sure as hell seems like our soldiers are dying the same deaths, and it is time that their leaders get into the good old OODA loop of the insurgents, and take the initiative back. I guess we’ll see if I’m right or not when the Corps goes back en masse next year.
Semper Fi.
FRUSTRATED CAPTAIN
Last edited by mudwoman on 11-20-2003 05:06 AM, edited 1 time in total.
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Col Hack,
I am retired military and volunteer at an Army Med Center in the USA.
Today I heard some things that disturb me and wanted to pass them along to someone who could apply heat in the right places if you think it appropriate and necessary.
I was told the following by a soldier assigned to help war wounded: A soldier wounded by an RPG (arm amputee, lots of shrapnel in the torso, bandages to be changed twice daily, damn lucky to be alive) was not admitted to the hospital but placed in Fisher House. He contacted the soldiers assigned to assist and requested transportation to the ER because he didn't feel well. He was apparently left in the ER observation room for several hours and was not admitted until the soldiers assigned to assist the wounded raised hell. This hospital treats a lot of civilian trauma cases in the San Antonio area and I hope they are not putting our wounded on back burner to "keep the body count" down or some other stupid reason such as giving priority to civilian trauma to train physicians.
The other vignette concerns an officer who told me not enough troops are dedicated to security in Irag to the point choppers are being shot at over their own bases. He also said he and his troops had to give up many of their weapons e. g. rocket launchers and were, in fact, using captured RPGs against the enemy. He went on to say, after coaxing, that the M-16 is a "piece of ****" that frequently jams in the dust and sand of Iraq. As a result, his guys were using captured AK-47s which you could "throw in a mud hole and they would still fire". He particularly liked the version of the AK with the folding stock because it was easier to use from a vehicle than the M-16 whose stock just got in the way.
Of course, I have no way of verifying these stories and am well acquainted with "outhouse rumors" but my guts tell me I heard the truth today. I have heard some reports in the press about wounded be screwed around getting treatment and this incident, if true, makes my blood boil. To have an assault rifle that sucks in combat even after all the mods is totally disgusting. These military men and women that followed my generation impress me with their professionalism and deserve better than I think they may be getting. Perhaps your sources can give you better intel. Stay after the perfumed princes.
Another retired Colonel
(Automatically edited by FF)
Col Hack,
I am retired military and volunteer at an Army Med Center in the USA.
Today I heard some things that disturb me and wanted to pass them along to someone who could apply heat in the right places if you think it appropriate and necessary.
I was told the following by a soldier assigned to help war wounded: A soldier wounded by an RPG (arm amputee, lots of shrapnel in the torso, bandages to be changed twice daily, damn lucky to be alive) was not admitted to the hospital but placed in Fisher House. He contacted the soldiers assigned to assist and requested transportation to the ER because he didn't feel well. He was apparently left in the ER observation room for several hours and was not admitted until the soldiers assigned to assist the wounded raised hell. This hospital treats a lot of civilian trauma cases in the San Antonio area and I hope they are not putting our wounded on back burner to "keep the body count" down or some other stupid reason such as giving priority to civilian trauma to train physicians.
The other vignette concerns an officer who told me not enough troops are dedicated to security in Irag to the point choppers are being shot at over their own bases. He also said he and his troops had to give up many of their weapons e. g. rocket launchers and were, in fact, using captured RPGs against the enemy. He went on to say, after coaxing, that the M-16 is a "piece of ****" that frequently jams in the dust and sand of Iraq. As a result, his guys were using captured AK-47s which you could "throw in a mud hole and they would still fire". He particularly liked the version of the AK with the folding stock because it was easier to use from a vehicle than the M-16 whose stock just got in the way.
Of course, I have no way of verifying these stories and am well acquainted with "outhouse rumors" but my guts tell me I heard the truth today. I have heard some reports in the press about wounded be screwed around getting treatment and this incident, if true, makes my blood boil. To have an assault rifle that sucks in combat even after all the mods is totally disgusting. These military men and women that followed my generation impress me with their professionalism and deserve better than I think they may be getting. Perhaps your sources can give you better intel. Stay after the perfumed princes.
Another retired Colonel
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Subject: Reserves in Iraq
Sir,
I'm fairly new to the Reserves, but what I've seen so far is disgusting. I spent 5 years on active duty, and it wasn't much better there.
We were mobilized last December for OIF. As soon as we were mobilized our IMPAC card was shut off. The 88th RSC decided we were no longer their property, so we shouldn't be allowed to spend their money (as if we ever were). The real problems began when 3rd Army and CENTCOM began fighting over our unit. They both wanted our personnel, but no one wanted to subsidize us. What kind of unit could inspire such fighting? Ours, sir, is a Public Affairs HQ.
We are lucky. Most of us work in journalism or related fields as civilians. Our job skills didn't need polishing, but soldier skills were nearly nonexistent. I was a Specialist and the only soldier with any real tactical experience. Our replacement SGM had never deployed she replaced a SGM who heard rumors of the deployment and pulled strings until he got himself transferred. He's never deployed either.
After we were mobilized several soldiers went to Minnesota to pick up our Humvees and other MTOE items. Our vehicles had been used by the RSC, apparently for parts. Nothing major. Just door handles, mirrors, doors, antennas, etc. The usual things you expect to get stolen if you can't guard your own vehicles. (I suppose this hasn't changed since your time.) Anyway, being new to the Reserve experience, I was appalled to discover that our MTOE provided for one SINCGARS radio. ONE! No OE-254, no base station, no portable radios (not even a manpack). We were, however, blessed with 8 humvees no way to communicate between them, but I ask for too much, perhaps.
Drivers' training consisted of one road test, conducted by a junior soldier one month out of AIT. The student drivers drove around the block and were duly licensed.
So, it continued: our chemical detection equipment was 10 years out of date, as were the test kits. We had approximately 115 9mm clips, but only 20 30-round magazines for our M-16's. In my unit we have fewer than ten 9mm pistols, more than 30 rifles. (Incidentally, I never once was able to carry a full combat load. Nor was anyone ever issued personal magazines. Each time we went out, before, during and after the war, most soldiers were able to take only three magazines, which came from a common box.)
All our PV2's were promoted to PFC. All on waivers.
At last we reached Ft. Benning. We spent 47 days there. Not enough time, apparently, to qualify with our weapons, or to learn convoy operations, dismounted movement training, additional drivers' training, or even practice submitting a SALUTE report. Not to even mention medical care. No Reservists were allowed to see a dentist or a doctor for routine care. Not even a tooth cleaning or a physical. Nothing. We did work at the newspaper.
Radio training was conducted all theory. We didn't have batteries. Or a handset.
PLGR training was also theory. No batteries. No maps.
I taught two Staff Sergeants how to use the TAS-C to get training aids. I obtained materials covering DU, UXO, and mine awareness, among other subjects. I offered to teach classes on these topics as well as others I'd learned on active duty. I was told the schedule didn't allow it we were committed to working for Ft. Benning's PAO.
No new equipment arrived.
We deployed. If you want to call it that. Our unit was sent to live near the civilian journalists in the Kuwait Hilton. Not too bad. We went out daily, escorting journalists to newsworthy sites. During the war, we sent convoys into Iraq. Mercifully, no one died.
We used cell phones to communicate inside Kuwait, luck in Iraq.
We begged office supplies from the journalists we were accrediting and escorting.
We begged equipment from the US Embassy representative or from the Kuwaitis.
We relied on the Kuwaiti military for our security, since CENTCOM forces were tied up down in Qatar at the million dollar briefing room and nearly empty press center.
We received nothing from CENTCOM, our parent unit.
ORHA (CPA) arrived. They went swimming. All of them. They had office space they took much of ours but it seemed like they all spent most of their days on the beach. (By comparison, I was at the hotel for a month before I knew how to get to the pool. I didn't have time to use it for six weeks, which was well after the UK troops started coming for R&R.)
Anyway, our living conditions were never anything to complain about. Even after we moved north, we lived in the CPA palace in the ballroom (described by our temporary boss, Madeline Albright, as horrendous living conditions.). Far better than the bombed-out buildings and empty lots that many units called home.
We made do, as soldiers have for centuries. We scrounged furniture from Iraqi barracks nearby. We got small Humvee parts from the active duty MP unit that lived across the way. And from our new bosses, I began asking for the things we needed in order to safely operate our daily convoys around Baghdad, specifically maps and radios.
My husband, from his duty station in Germany, sent me a street map of Baghdad he'd bought on the internet. It was the only map of Baghdad we ever got.
The radios I requested in May arrived in July, just as we were leaving. I tried to pick them up for our replacements, only to be told I couldn't have them. Why not? They were set to frequencies which were illegal in the middle east they had come from the US. Besides, I was told, if they were issued, they'd be going to the Iraqis CPA had just hired to help secure the convention center.
The supply thing is a real sore point for me. We wanted the radios and maps to ensure the safety of our soldiers. The infantrymen (from the Florida National Guard) securing our building and the convention center were still using field phones that looked like they were straight out of Vietnam. Our intentions were to issue half the radios to them, and half to our convoys. Apparently, though, the CPA thought it was more important to spend money on filling and refilling the palace pool four times and buying personal refrigerators for every office and trailer.
Most of the people who were Washington's first string, the ones who spent their days by the pool in Kuwait, left within a month. After the big names left, all the Ambassadors and former Generals, the rest of the rats couldn't get out of there fast enough. Two months in, we were working for an entirely new group. By the time we left, in July, the third string was already rolling in.
In the meantime, the CPA people were also making regular trips back to the Kuwait Hilton for R&R.
I could go on, but this is making me ill. The reason Iraq and the Reserves are a mess is because perfumed princes beget perfumed princes. Military and civilian alike.
AN UNHAPPY CAMPER
(Automatically edited by FF)
Subject: Reserves in Iraq
Sir,
I'm fairly new to the Reserves, but what I've seen so far is disgusting. I spent 5 years on active duty, and it wasn't much better there.
We were mobilized last December for OIF. As soon as we were mobilized our IMPAC card was shut off. The 88th RSC decided we were no longer their property, so we shouldn't be allowed to spend their money (as if we ever were). The real problems began when 3rd Army and CENTCOM began fighting over our unit. They both wanted our personnel, but no one wanted to subsidize us. What kind of unit could inspire such fighting? Ours, sir, is a Public Affairs HQ.
We are lucky. Most of us work in journalism or related fields as civilians. Our job skills didn't need polishing, but soldier skills were nearly nonexistent. I was a Specialist and the only soldier with any real tactical experience. Our replacement SGM had never deployed she replaced a SGM who heard rumors of the deployment and pulled strings until he got himself transferred. He's never deployed either.
After we were mobilized several soldiers went to Minnesota to pick up our Humvees and other MTOE items. Our vehicles had been used by the RSC, apparently for parts. Nothing major. Just door handles, mirrors, doors, antennas, etc. The usual things you expect to get stolen if you can't guard your own vehicles. (I suppose this hasn't changed since your time.) Anyway, being new to the Reserve experience, I was appalled to discover that our MTOE provided for one SINCGARS radio. ONE! No OE-254, no base station, no portable radios (not even a manpack). We were, however, blessed with 8 humvees no way to communicate between them, but I ask for too much, perhaps.
Drivers' training consisted of one road test, conducted by a junior soldier one month out of AIT. The student drivers drove around the block and were duly licensed.
So, it continued: our chemical detection equipment was 10 years out of date, as were the test kits. We had approximately 115 9mm clips, but only 20 30-round magazines for our M-16's. In my unit we have fewer than ten 9mm pistols, more than 30 rifles. (Incidentally, I never once was able to carry a full combat load. Nor was anyone ever issued personal magazines. Each time we went out, before, during and after the war, most soldiers were able to take only three magazines, which came from a common box.)
All our PV2's were promoted to PFC. All on waivers.
At last we reached Ft. Benning. We spent 47 days there. Not enough time, apparently, to qualify with our weapons, or to learn convoy operations, dismounted movement training, additional drivers' training, or even practice submitting a SALUTE report. Not to even mention medical care. No Reservists were allowed to see a dentist or a doctor for routine care. Not even a tooth cleaning or a physical. Nothing. We did work at the newspaper.
Radio training was conducted all theory. We didn't have batteries. Or a handset.
PLGR training was also theory. No batteries. No maps.
I taught two Staff Sergeants how to use the TAS-C to get training aids. I obtained materials covering DU, UXO, and mine awareness, among other subjects. I offered to teach classes on these topics as well as others I'd learned on active duty. I was told the schedule didn't allow it we were committed to working for Ft. Benning's PAO.
No new equipment arrived.
We deployed. If you want to call it that. Our unit was sent to live near the civilian journalists in the Kuwait Hilton. Not too bad. We went out daily, escorting journalists to newsworthy sites. During the war, we sent convoys into Iraq. Mercifully, no one died.
We used cell phones to communicate inside Kuwait, luck in Iraq.
We begged office supplies from the journalists we were accrediting and escorting.
We begged equipment from the US Embassy representative or from the Kuwaitis.
We relied on the Kuwaiti military for our security, since CENTCOM forces were tied up down in Qatar at the million dollar briefing room and nearly empty press center.
We received nothing from CENTCOM, our parent unit.
ORHA (CPA) arrived. They went swimming. All of them. They had office space they took much of ours but it seemed like they all spent most of their days on the beach. (By comparison, I was at the hotel for a month before I knew how to get to the pool. I didn't have time to use it for six weeks, which was well after the UK troops started coming for R&R.)
Anyway, our living conditions were never anything to complain about. Even after we moved north, we lived in the CPA palace in the ballroom (described by our temporary boss, Madeline Albright, as horrendous living conditions.). Far better than the bombed-out buildings and empty lots that many units called home.
We made do, as soldiers have for centuries. We scrounged furniture from Iraqi barracks nearby. We got small Humvee parts from the active duty MP unit that lived across the way. And from our new bosses, I began asking for the things we needed in order to safely operate our daily convoys around Baghdad, specifically maps and radios.
My husband, from his duty station in Germany, sent me a street map of Baghdad he'd bought on the internet. It was the only map of Baghdad we ever got.
The radios I requested in May arrived in July, just as we were leaving. I tried to pick them up for our replacements, only to be told I couldn't have them. Why not? They were set to frequencies which were illegal in the middle east they had come from the US. Besides, I was told, if they were issued, they'd be going to the Iraqis CPA had just hired to help secure the convention center.
The supply thing is a real sore point for me. We wanted the radios and maps to ensure the safety of our soldiers. The infantrymen (from the Florida National Guard) securing our building and the convention center were still using field phones that looked like they were straight out of Vietnam. Our intentions were to issue half the radios to them, and half to our convoys. Apparently, though, the CPA thought it was more important to spend money on filling and refilling the palace pool four times and buying personal refrigerators for every office and trailer.
Most of the people who were Washington's first string, the ones who spent their days by the pool in Kuwait, left within a month. After the big names left, all the Ambassadors and former Generals, the rest of the rats couldn't get out of there fast enough. Two months in, we were working for an entirely new group. By the time we left, in July, the third string was already rolling in.
In the meantime, the CPA people were also making regular trips back to the Kuwait Hilton for R&R.
I could go on, but this is making me ill. The reason Iraq and the Reserves are a mess is because perfumed princes beget perfumed princes. Military and civilian alike.
AN UNHAPPY CAMPER
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ
Colonel Hackworth,
My name is PFC G.I. Joe (name changed to protect the innocent), and I am currently serving in Iraq as an M-240B machine-gunner in a mechanized infantry company.
One of my buddies happened to bring a copy of your book, Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts, over with him. Reading it over the past few days I’ve noticed striking similarities between your experiences and observations in Vietnam and my own experience here in Iraq.
Ninety-nine percent of the fighting we’ve done has been in an urban environment. While concrete and buildings are a far cry from the jungle of Vietnam, they present nearly congruent problems of disorientation and vulnerability to ambush.
I wish my chain of command would have read your book before we deployed. Our CO came to us from a maintenance slot (battalion motor officer) about seven months ago. Not only is he inexperienced in infantry, but arrogant as well.
It’s a combination that has bred an atmosphere of total distrust and doubt within our company. Personally, I don’t think he's fit to lead a latrine-burning detail. Back in the States, he was more worried about shined boots and razor-sharp creases than preparing for war.
For example, we deployed with eight out of 15 SAWs (Squad Automatic Weapons) broken. One of my buddies’ SAW had no safety. Just a hole in the pistol grip where the safety was supposed to be. The only reason we haven't suffered more casualties is the result of a squared-away sergeant armorer who begged, borrowed and stole what parts we needed before we crossed the Line of Departure.
On the flip side, we have extremely competent sergeants who have taken us through and never stumbled. If it wasn’t for our E-5 and E-6 types (midlevel sergeants), I don’t know if I’d be writing this letter. More likely I’d be on my way home in a body bag.
It was not my intention for this to be a bitchfest. I want to thank you for writing your book in a way that a grunt like me can understand. As you stated, the basics of war never change. With all the laser-guided bombs and high-speed tanks we have, I still had to run my butt off dodging bullets and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). And let me tell you, these guys don’t die easy. You can pump 15 or 20 rounds into them, and they still try to whack you.
It is my hope that when I become an NCO (sergeant) that I can combine my firsthand knowledge of war and the insights of good leaders such as yourself and those you describe in your book, to mold a kick-ass squad that will make it home despite pretty-boy officers and a politically correct environment that pervades today’s Army.
You have my thanks for your book and your candor, and sir, I know you get a lot of mail, but if you could possibly let me know how to get hold of your tactical publications I would greatly appreciate it.
With greatest admiration and most of all respect,
--Pfc. G.I. Joe
(Automatically edited by FF)
SOMEWHERE IN IRAQ
Colonel Hackworth,
My name is PFC G.I. Joe (name changed to protect the innocent), and I am currently serving in Iraq as an M-240B machine-gunner in a mechanized infantry company.
One of my buddies happened to bring a copy of your book, Steel My Soldiers’ Hearts, over with him. Reading it over the past few days I’ve noticed striking similarities between your experiences and observations in Vietnam and my own experience here in Iraq.
Ninety-nine percent of the fighting we’ve done has been in an urban environment. While concrete and buildings are a far cry from the jungle of Vietnam, they present nearly congruent problems of disorientation and vulnerability to ambush.
I wish my chain of command would have read your book before we deployed. Our CO came to us from a maintenance slot (battalion motor officer) about seven months ago. Not only is he inexperienced in infantry, but arrogant as well.
It’s a combination that has bred an atmosphere of total distrust and doubt within our company. Personally, I don’t think he's fit to lead a latrine-burning detail. Back in the States, he was more worried about shined boots and razor-sharp creases than preparing for war.
For example, we deployed with eight out of 15 SAWs (Squad Automatic Weapons) broken. One of my buddies’ SAW had no safety. Just a hole in the pistol grip where the safety was supposed to be. The only reason we haven't suffered more casualties is the result of a squared-away sergeant armorer who begged, borrowed and stole what parts we needed before we crossed the Line of Departure.
On the flip side, we have extremely competent sergeants who have taken us through and never stumbled. If it wasn’t for our E-5 and E-6 types (midlevel sergeants), I don’t know if I’d be writing this letter. More likely I’d be on my way home in a body bag.
It was not my intention for this to be a bitchfest. I want to thank you for writing your book in a way that a grunt like me can understand. As you stated, the basics of war never change. With all the laser-guided bombs and high-speed tanks we have, I still had to run my butt off dodging bullets and RPGs (rocket-propelled grenades). And let me tell you, these guys don’t die easy. You can pump 15 or 20 rounds into them, and they still try to whack you.
It is my hope that when I become an NCO (sergeant) that I can combine my firsthand knowledge of war and the insights of good leaders such as yourself and those you describe in your book, to mold a kick-ass squad that will make it home despite pretty-boy officers and a politically correct environment that pervades today’s Army.
You have my thanks for your book and your candor, and sir, I know you get a lot of mail, but if you could possibly let me know how to get hold of your tactical publications I would greatly appreciate it.
With greatest admiration and most of all respect,
--Pfc. G.I. Joe
(Reposted with permission from Col. David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
A Failed PC Experiment
Subject: Women in the Military
I heard you speaking with G.Gordon Liddy today as I was returning to Ft. Campbell, KY. I am a female soldier (now a Reservist). Long story short, I was so happy to hear someone say what I have been saying since my active duty days in the mid 90's.
I know I am supposed to "stay quiet" and "not repeat this" to prevent the proverbial tar and feathering I might receive if some other females hear my opinion but I will not be quiet and I will repeat myself. WOMEN DO NOT BELONG IN COMBAT. Yes, I believe we can have a profound effect on America's military but we ARE NOT men, we CAN'T (oh my God, I said it) do everything men can do, and we have NO BUSINESS ON THE FRONT LINES OF COMBAT. I personally believe it degrades the ESpirit De Corp of the units and, due to the instinctive protective nature of men and the instinctive nurturing nature of women, IT DOESN'T WORK WELL.
I would give almost anything to have back the WAC or to have some other similar area of the military from which to work. Although I volunteered to go to Iraq (and ended up at Ft. Campbell) I certainly only wanted to be there to help heal the wounded, I did not want to go there to do battle.
If you have any suggestions how I may start a movement to return the WAC's (or a similar unit) to the military, I will be grateful for any suggestions. I have considered writing to President Bush but don't really think that will be effective.
Thank you for your service to our Country and for this forum.
Sincerely,
ARMY SGT
Soldiers For The Truth
(Automatically edited by FF)
A Failed PC Experiment
Subject: Women in the Military
I heard you speaking with G.Gordon Liddy today as I was returning to Ft. Campbell, KY. I am a female soldier (now a Reservist). Long story short, I was so happy to hear someone say what I have been saying since my active duty days in the mid 90's.
I know I am supposed to "stay quiet" and "not repeat this" to prevent the proverbial tar and feathering I might receive if some other females hear my opinion but I will not be quiet and I will repeat myself. WOMEN DO NOT BELONG IN COMBAT. Yes, I believe we can have a profound effect on America's military but we ARE NOT men, we CAN'T (oh my God, I said it) do everything men can do, and we have NO BUSINESS ON THE FRONT LINES OF COMBAT. I personally believe it degrades the ESpirit De Corp of the units and, due to the instinctive protective nature of men and the instinctive nurturing nature of women, IT DOESN'T WORK WELL.
I would give almost anything to have back the WAC or to have some other similar area of the military from which to work. Although I volunteered to go to Iraq (and ended up at Ft. Campbell) I certainly only wanted to be there to help heal the wounded, I did not want to go there to do battle.
If you have any suggestions how I may start a movement to return the WAC's (or a similar unit) to the military, I will be grateful for any suggestions. I have considered writing to President Bush but don't really think that will be effective.
Thank you for your service to our Country and for this forum.
Sincerely,
ARMY SGT
Soldiers For The Truth
(Reposted with permission from David Hackworth)
(Automatically edited by FF)
Is Army Aviation In A Tailspin?
Hack,
Why have we lost helicopters needlessly?
We have forgotten how to fly them tactically. In Vietnam the greatest threat we faced in helicopters were AKs and .51 Caliber Machine Guns. RPGs were only a threat in the LZs or on short final or immediately after takeoff. How did we fly to avoid the threat? Either at 1500 feet above the terrain above the threat of AKs and RPGs or right on the deck as fast as we could go. 51s scared the **** out of us. If they were known or suspected we were on the deck. You couldn’t get high enough to get out of range of a .51.
What else did we do? We never hovered unless we absolutely had too. And whenever we were transiting the area between the deck and 1500 feet above the ground we did it a rapidly as possible, high overhead approaches, and maximum climbs. Were we cowboying the aircraft? No!!! We had actually done a risk assessment although we didn’t call it that then and determined that this was the safest way to operate, minimize threat, and accomplish the mission. One final thing that we did whenever possible, we went with gun cover. The hottest part of my tour was when the 1st Cav went into War Zone C north of Tay Ninh Mountain in the spring of ’70. Up there our lifts consisted of 6-8 Slicks, 5 Cobras (one team of Guns and a heavy fire team of ARA), and an OV-10 and whatever fast movers the OV-10 had with him. Cobras accompanied single and two ship Log (resupply) missions during this period. We did the best we could to protect ourselves with flying techniques and gun cover. Were we always successful? No, ask any veteran of the 227th or 229th Assault Helicopter Battalions (particularly Alpha and Charlie 229th). We lost aircraft and we lost people but not because we flew stupid or didn’t have armed support.
Where did we first learn of these techniques? In the four- week tactical phase of flight school at Fort Rucker. Then they were then drummed into us by the Aircraft Commanders we flew with when we arrived in Vietnam and then when we became Aircraft Commanders we drummed it into the new guys. Crew coordination in those days consisted of phrases like “Are you tryin’ to ****in’ kill me new guy?” and the like. But we weren’t trying to be mean or offend anyone or be politically incorrect we were being taught and teaching 22 year old aviators like ourselves how to stay alive (and keep their crews and passengers alive).
What has Army Aviation forgotten and how did it happen? First of all they don’t even teach tactics at Fort Rucker anymore. Secondly, in the seventies the Aviation School began teaching two tactically bogus techniques; Nap of the Earth Flying, and Night Vision Goggles. (They also began insisting Aviators put on face paint I guess to hide the fact that there was a crew in the helicopter the bad guys had in their sights while it hovered). Nap of the Earth was taught at tree top level at airspeeds varying from zero to 60 knots with stops to hover (called masking and unmasking). This technique supposedly minimized the threat from SA-7s, ZSU 23s, and other heat seeking or radar controlled anti-aircraft weapons. Great! Problem is though, anyone flying this way is susceptible to being blown out of the sky by a bad guy with a .22 rifle let alone an RPG. NVG training was more of the same, low and slow, mask and unmask, the theory being that if you had the goggles on and the lights out they couldn’t see you. Horse****.
What other factors contributed to Army Aviation’s forgetfulness in the seventies and eighties? The gunships quit covering the slicks. From 1976 when I joined the Guard until now I was involved in one training exercise in which as a slick pilot I was covered by real (not notional) gunships and that was only because a couple of other Vietnam vets in the Guard with me and I organized the combat assault training exercise. By that time half of the pilots in my unit had never flown with gun cover and for instance the girl pilot who was flying with me that day completely freaked out went she saw the guns make a run just prior to our touch down in the LZ. Since the guns no longer covered slicks what were they doing? They were practicing hovering fire, masking and unmasking, so they could shoot Russian tanks at long range. They practiced so much that they forgot running fire.
Two years ago I attended an Army conference and one of the speakers was an active duty warrant officer aviator who had been shot down over Mogadishu about a month prior to the Black Hawk Down debacle. His presentation was about how his aircraft was shot down and the harrowing night he spent with the other pilot (the backseat crewmembers were killed) and awaited rescue which came the next morning in the form of Pakistani Armor. This aviator also discussed his injuries, in particular, the burns he suffered. During his presentation there were a number of spontaneous “Hooahs” from the audience. He stated that his aircraft, a Blackhawk, was at 300 feet above Mogadishu at 70 knots, they were flying goggles, when they got hit with an RPG. He also stated that they were flying a route that they flew nightly in the past. As I listened to this narrative my thoughts were “Are you ****in’ crazy? Do you have a death wish?” of course this aviator stated that he wished it would have been darker that night so they would have been undetected and not blown out of the sky. In the photos of the wounds sustained, shown with the presentation, were two serious burns to the thighs where the pilot had his two medal knee boards fastened. He was not going more then 10 nautical miles from Mogadishu International where they staged from. What in the hell did he need the knee boards for?
Over and over it’s happened. Blackhawk Down, hovering over known ground to air (a month after the previous shoot down), Anaconda (we’ll sneak up on ‘em in a Chinook without a prep or gun cover), the 11th Group Apache attack last spring (hovering fire, everyone took hits, two POWs from an apparently flyable aircraft and no downed aircraft support) and now in Iraq.
How did Army Aviation get into this mess? I can see three clear reasons:
1. The Aircrew Training Program
2. The Briefing Statement
3. The Inexperience of the Aircrews and Aircraft Availability and Blade Time Restrictions
The Aircrew Training Program
The aircrew training program looks good on paper but it is not doing what it was designed to do, train aircrews to perform combat missions with minimal risk. The program begins when an aviator or enlisted crewmember arrives at their unit with a commander’s evaluation. The newly assigned aviator/crewmember then goes through three levels of readiness progression until he or she is deemed mission trained. Problem is, their not. This training program takes soldiers, aviators and crewmembers, through various tasks they must perform to standard but there is no emphasis on decision-making or how to conduct a mission to support a supported unit. Therefore, tasks can be performed, i. e. Takeoff to a Hover, Perform NOE Flight, Perform Masking and Unmasking, and a whole laundry list of other minutiae but there is no emphasis on the stuff that matters on the battlefield when decisions must be instantaneous and based on proven tactical principles.
The Briefing Statement
The briefing statement is probably the worst thing that has happened to Army Aviation since Vietnam. Developed by GEN Maxwell (Mad Max) Thurman, a non-aviator, and TRADOC Commander in the eighties this policy requires all aviators to be briefed by a designated briefer before all missions. The briefer, often the unit commander, but many times a non aviator, often has less experience than the crew performing the mission.
Only tasks specifically briefed may be performed by the crew during the mission without a call “home” to do something not on the statement. Flying along at a briefed altitude of say 250 feet at say 90-100 knots the crew sees a coupla bad guys with RPGs off to their right, oughta turn left and hit the deck at high speed immediately—gotta call home-left turns and altitude changes weren’t on the briefing statement.
The Inexperience of the Aircrews and Aircraft Availability and Blade Time Restrictions
Aircraft availability is not good. Many units inflate operational readiness by carrying aircraft with less than ten hours remaining to major maintenance as operationally ready which they technically are, but not for long if there flown, and thus are unusable assets for quality training. The aircrews just don’t have the flight time. Several years ago an internal study showed that the average aviation battalion commander had around 700 hours of flight time including flight school time. I had that much time in the first four months of my Vietnam tour. How is a 700 hour pilot going to conduct a proper tactical briefing. Another problem is the MTOE structure. Warrant Officers leave operational flying positions (except the 160th, Chinooks, and Apaches) upon reaching CW3. They have to quit being line pilots when they have finally acquired most of the experience they need to do the job right.
Are There Solutions
There are solutions.
First, realistic multi-echelon mission scenarios must be incorporated into the aircrew training program. These scenarios must be designed to challenge the aircrew with fluent changing situations that require decision making on the spot. Pilots must make mission decisions based on the mission situation not based on what the briefer said prior to the mission. The goal of this training should be that every briefing statement is very simple: Support the supported unit.
Second, put the lieutenants in flying positions and make them fly. Don’t give them any responsibilities other than being pilots and develop them into aircraft commanders like the warrants. Then when they are captains they will have some experience.
Third, let the warrants stay in line pilot positions right through CW4 in the line units.
Last, seek out Vietnam helicopter pilots and listen to what they have to say about flying in tactical situations, no more low and slow!
By an “OLD ARMY WARRANT”
(Automatically edited by FF)
Is Army Aviation In A Tailspin?
Hack,
Why have we lost helicopters needlessly?
We have forgotten how to fly them tactically. In Vietnam the greatest threat we faced in helicopters were AKs and .51 Caliber Machine Guns. RPGs were only a threat in the LZs or on short final or immediately after takeoff. How did we fly to avoid the threat? Either at 1500 feet above the terrain above the threat of AKs and RPGs or right on the deck as fast as we could go. 51s scared the **** out of us. If they were known or suspected we were on the deck. You couldn’t get high enough to get out of range of a .51.
What else did we do? We never hovered unless we absolutely had too. And whenever we were transiting the area between the deck and 1500 feet above the ground we did it a rapidly as possible, high overhead approaches, and maximum climbs. Were we cowboying the aircraft? No!!! We had actually done a risk assessment although we didn’t call it that then and determined that this was the safest way to operate, minimize threat, and accomplish the mission. One final thing that we did whenever possible, we went with gun cover. The hottest part of my tour was when the 1st Cav went into War Zone C north of Tay Ninh Mountain in the spring of ’70. Up there our lifts consisted of 6-8 Slicks, 5 Cobras (one team of Guns and a heavy fire team of ARA), and an OV-10 and whatever fast movers the OV-10 had with him. Cobras accompanied single and two ship Log (resupply) missions during this period. We did the best we could to protect ourselves with flying techniques and gun cover. Were we always successful? No, ask any veteran of the 227th or 229th Assault Helicopter Battalions (particularly Alpha and Charlie 229th). We lost aircraft and we lost people but not because we flew stupid or didn’t have armed support.
Where did we first learn of these techniques? In the four- week tactical phase of flight school at Fort Rucker. Then they were then drummed into us by the Aircraft Commanders we flew with when we arrived in Vietnam and then when we became Aircraft Commanders we drummed it into the new guys. Crew coordination in those days consisted of phrases like “Are you tryin’ to ****in’ kill me new guy?” and the like. But we weren’t trying to be mean or offend anyone or be politically incorrect we were being taught and teaching 22 year old aviators like ourselves how to stay alive (and keep their crews and passengers alive).
What has Army Aviation forgotten and how did it happen? First of all they don’t even teach tactics at Fort Rucker anymore. Secondly, in the seventies the Aviation School began teaching two tactically bogus techniques; Nap of the Earth Flying, and Night Vision Goggles. (They also began insisting Aviators put on face paint I guess to hide the fact that there was a crew in the helicopter the bad guys had in their sights while it hovered). Nap of the Earth was taught at tree top level at airspeeds varying from zero to 60 knots with stops to hover (called masking and unmasking). This technique supposedly minimized the threat from SA-7s, ZSU 23s, and other heat seeking or radar controlled anti-aircraft weapons. Great! Problem is though, anyone flying this way is susceptible to being blown out of the sky by a bad guy with a .22 rifle let alone an RPG. NVG training was more of the same, low and slow, mask and unmask, the theory being that if you had the goggles on and the lights out they couldn’t see you. Horse****.
What other factors contributed to Army Aviation’s forgetfulness in the seventies and eighties? The gunships quit covering the slicks. From 1976 when I joined the Guard until now I was involved in one training exercise in which as a slick pilot I was covered by real (not notional) gunships and that was only because a couple of other Vietnam vets in the Guard with me and I organized the combat assault training exercise. By that time half of the pilots in my unit had never flown with gun cover and for instance the girl pilot who was flying with me that day completely freaked out went she saw the guns make a run just prior to our touch down in the LZ. Since the guns no longer covered slicks what were they doing? They were practicing hovering fire, masking and unmasking, so they could shoot Russian tanks at long range. They practiced so much that they forgot running fire.
Two years ago I attended an Army conference and one of the speakers was an active duty warrant officer aviator who had been shot down over Mogadishu about a month prior to the Black Hawk Down debacle. His presentation was about how his aircraft was shot down and the harrowing night he spent with the other pilot (the backseat crewmembers were killed) and awaited rescue which came the next morning in the form of Pakistani Armor. This aviator also discussed his injuries, in particular, the burns he suffered. During his presentation there were a number of spontaneous “Hooahs” from the audience. He stated that his aircraft, a Blackhawk, was at 300 feet above Mogadishu at 70 knots, they were flying goggles, when they got hit with an RPG. He also stated that they were flying a route that they flew nightly in the past. As I listened to this narrative my thoughts were “Are you ****in’ crazy? Do you have a death wish?” of course this aviator stated that he wished it would have been darker that night so they would have been undetected and not blown out of the sky. In the photos of the wounds sustained, shown with the presentation, were two serious burns to the thighs where the pilot had his two medal knee boards fastened. He was not going more then 10 nautical miles from Mogadishu International where they staged from. What in the hell did he need the knee boards for?
Over and over it’s happened. Blackhawk Down, hovering over known ground to air (a month after the previous shoot down), Anaconda (we’ll sneak up on ‘em in a Chinook without a prep or gun cover), the 11th Group Apache attack last spring (hovering fire, everyone took hits, two POWs from an apparently flyable aircraft and no downed aircraft support) and now in Iraq.
How did Army Aviation get into this mess? I can see three clear reasons:
1. The Aircrew Training Program
2. The Briefing Statement
3. The Inexperience of the Aircrews and Aircraft Availability and Blade Time Restrictions
The Aircrew Training Program
The aircrew training program looks good on paper but it is not doing what it was designed to do, train aircrews to perform combat missions with minimal risk. The program begins when an aviator or enlisted crewmember arrives at their unit with a commander’s evaluation. The newly assigned aviator/crewmember then goes through three levels of readiness progression until he or she is deemed mission trained. Problem is, their not. This training program takes soldiers, aviators and crewmembers, through various tasks they must perform to standard but there is no emphasis on decision-making or how to conduct a mission to support a supported unit. Therefore, tasks can be performed, i. e. Takeoff to a Hover, Perform NOE Flight, Perform Masking and Unmasking, and a whole laundry list of other minutiae but there is no emphasis on the stuff that matters on the battlefield when decisions must be instantaneous and based on proven tactical principles.
The Briefing Statement
The briefing statement is probably the worst thing that has happened to Army Aviation since Vietnam. Developed by GEN Maxwell (Mad Max) Thurman, a non-aviator, and TRADOC Commander in the eighties this policy requires all aviators to be briefed by a designated briefer before all missions. The briefer, often the unit commander, but many times a non aviator, often has less experience than the crew performing the mission.
Only tasks specifically briefed may be performed by the crew during the mission without a call “home” to do something not on the statement. Flying along at a briefed altitude of say 250 feet at say 90-100 knots the crew sees a coupla bad guys with RPGs off to their right, oughta turn left and hit the deck at high speed immediately—gotta call home-left turns and altitude changes weren’t on the briefing statement.
The Inexperience of the Aircrews and Aircraft Availability and Blade Time Restrictions
Aircraft availability is not good. Many units inflate operational readiness by carrying aircraft with less than ten hours remaining to major maintenance as operationally ready which they technically are, but not for long if there flown, and thus are unusable assets for quality training. The aircrews just don’t have the flight time. Several years ago an internal study showed that the average aviation battalion commander had around 700 hours of flight time including flight school time. I had that much time in the first four months of my Vietnam tour. How is a 700 hour pilot going to conduct a proper tactical briefing. Another problem is the MTOE structure. Warrant Officers leave operational flying positions (except the 160th, Chinooks, and Apaches) upon reaching CW3. They have to quit being line pilots when they have finally acquired most of the experience they need to do the job right.
Are There Solutions
There are solutions.
First, realistic multi-echelon mission scenarios must be incorporated into the aircrew training program. These scenarios must be designed to challenge the aircrew with fluent changing situations that require decision making on the spot. Pilots must make mission decisions based on the mission situation not based on what the briefer said prior to the mission. The goal of this training should be that every briefing statement is very simple: Support the supported unit.
Second, put the lieutenants in flying positions and make them fly. Don’t give them any responsibilities other than being pilots and develop them into aircraft commanders like the warrants. Then when they are captains they will have some experience.
Third, let the warrants stay in line pilot positions right through CW4 in the line units.
Last, seek out Vietnam helicopter pilots and listen to what they have to say about flying in tactical situations, no more low and slow!
By an “OLD ARMY WARRANT”
-
TheBigLabowski
- Pirate
- Posts: 1614
- Joined: 04-01-2003 03:00 AM
Not to sound harsh, but I would really appreciate seeing the actual letter's scanned that are being posted here. Maybe I missed it in the post's. I don't know if I could trust a man that's trying to sell books and is part of a greater media with his own plans. Mudwomen, Do you have any links to the actual scanned letter's from the front? Or is it coming straight from Mr Hackworth? If you do, please PM me or post them here. I would really be interested in them. I trust you all, but not this guy Hackworth. Anyone can write something up to sell themselves.
---End Of Transmission---
Hi Labowski (great movie!)
I wonder why you would distrust a source like Hack while taking in the good news stories, which many of them have been proven to be fake copycat letters, blindly signed by soldiers. And why would you trust the media who have been proven to make false reports and are under pressure to report with a bias (both have been admitted by themselves).
Apart from that, I'm sure there's good news to tell from Iraq. Question is only: does it take the bad news away or change the content and its meaning?
I wonder why you would distrust a source like Hack while taking in the good news stories, which many of them have been proven to be fake copycat letters, blindly signed by soldiers. And why would you trust the media who have been proven to make false reports and are under pressure to report with a bias (both have been admitted by themselves).
Apart from that, I'm sure there's good news to tell from Iraq. Question is only: does it take the bad news away or change the content and its meaning?